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Abstract
Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) provisions are used by state highway agencies as a contract
method when early completion is needed for a highway construction project. I/D can
provide encouragement for contractors to complete highway construction projects by
giving them incentives to finish ahead of the required schedule. The incentive amount
should be enough to encourage contractors to accelerate their schedules while, at the
same time, making up for any cost incur when doing so. Additionally, in order not to
waste tax payers’ money, the incentives should be limited to a reasonable amount. Setting
a cap for incentive is one of the most important procedures that Departments of
Transportation (DOTs) undertake when drafting I/D contracts. This study evaluates
different methods that have been used to set incentive and disincentive amounts for I/D
contracts. The advantages and disadvantages of these methods are then examined and
analyzed.
Keywords: Incentive/Disincentive Contracting, highway construction, I/D amount
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Evaluation of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting Methods for Highway Construction
Projects
Since the 1990s, state highway agencies have begun to implement incentives and
disincentives (I/D) contracts that aim for early completion of highway construction
projects (Ellis and Pyeon 2005). Various I/D contracting plans include schedule-based
I/D for early completion of work, cost-based I/D for reducing project costs, and
performance-based I/D for improving project quality and safety. The design and
implementation of schedule-based I/D are relatively easy and inexpensive (AbuHijileh
and Ibbs 1989).
Among these three I/D methods, early completion has been the most popular I/D
plan for transportation construction projects. Its original design awarded the contractor
with financial incentives to accelerate a schedule, and then decreased any user costs
resulting from the inconvenience of the construction. On the other hand, if a project
completion was delayed, financial disincentives would be collected from the contractor to
make up for the loss of user costs. Thus far, I/D have been limited to only a few highway
construction projects because of the increased effort involved. I/D contracts do not come
without a price. I/D provisions require increased administration to determine when
project targets have been reached (Jaraiedi, Plummer and Aber 1995). Also, the DOT
staffs need to evaluate and decide if the amount of the incentive, as well as the amount of
the disincentive, cap setting, and all relative provisions in the contracts is appropriate.
Generally, I/D contracts are limited to those projects whose execution would severely
disrupt highway traffic or highway services, significantly increase road user costs,
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considerably affect adjacent neighborhoods and businesses, or complete a gap in the
highway system to provide a major improvement (FHWA 1989). I/D are assessed on a
daily basis and can be used to achieve specific milestones within a project or to
encourage timely completion of the total contract (FDOT 1996–1997, 1997–1998).
Because of the inherent character of the I/D contracting methods, both DOTs and
contractors are cautious when selecting and dealing with them. This directed project will
list, analyze, and summarize the methods proposed in the existing literature and
documentation on setting incentive and disincentive amount for highway projects.
Recommendations will be given based on the analysis.
Statement of Problem
I/D has been used in highway construction for more than 20 years, but it is still not
a common highway contracting method. DOTs will only choose I/D when the projects
need urgently to be finished.
When setting the cap incentive amount for a project, the DOT needs not only to
make the amount sufficient to compensate for the energy that the contractors will spend
on

scheduling acceleration, but also to make sure the cost of the incentive is less than

the public cost of delay caused by the construction. In other words, the DOT needs to
provide a reasonable amount for the incentive to make sure it is attractive enough to
motivate contractors to accelerate their schedules, while at the same time not wasting tax
payers’ money. Therefore, when choosing I/D as the contracting method, one of the
DOT’s essential assignments is to set an appropriate amount of incentive for the contract.
Significance of Problem
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Although setting cap incentive amounts is an important process in I/D contracting,
there is no official regulation or rule to guide DOTs on how to actually do this. While the
basic concept of using the I/D is simple, there is some variation (Shr and Chen 2004).
The bottom line for determining I/D rates is that the rates should reflect the cost of
savings/delays to the public and the savings/extra administrative costs to the DOTs
(Herbsman 1995). The I/D amount should include various costs such as (1) safety of the
users; (2) the loss of user time due to construction; (3) an increase in gasoline
consumption; and (4) the increased administrative and monitoring associated with the use
of an I/D contact (Jaraiedi 1995). Most DOTs employ the daily road user cost (RUC) as
the basis for determining an appropriate I/D amount (Herbsman 1995). Some states,
however, count on other parameters. DOTs are free to choose their own methods of
determining incentive and disincentive amounts. Nevertheless, they do need some
guidance to help them decide how to set these amounts.
Statement of Purpose
This directed project reviews the literature and summarizes different methods used
for setting the incentive and disincentive amounts for I/D contracts. It also provides a
comparison of different methods for setting incentive amount by examining selected case
studies. Finally, the study concludes by identifying advantages and disadvantages of
different methods and then providing some recommendations on how to choose an
appropriate method for a specific contract.
Definitions


Incentive/Disincentive contracting method: A highway construction contracting
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method that awards the contractor with incentives for accelerating the schedule and
then decreases users’ costs caused by the inconvenience of construction. It also
collects the disincentives from the contractors to make up for the losses for users’
costs if a project’s completion is delayed (Ellis and Pyeon 2005).


Road User Cost (RUC): The estimated cost to the general public resulting from travel
delays due to construction work or other incidents that impede traffic.



Cost of acceleration: The additional cost a contractor incurs due to expediting the
delivery of a contract. This includes direct and indirect costs, profit, and additional
markup.



Liquidated damages: A monetary component included in some construction contracts
to encourage completion of the project or a segment of the project by a specified date.
Assumptions
This directed project is based upon the following assumptions:

1. DOTs need some guidance to help them set incentive and disincentive amounts for
I/D contracts;
2. There should be at least one method among the different methods used for setting
incentive and disincentive amounts that is better suited for a specific I/D contract than
other methods;
3. The data that is used in the case study of this project is historical data of Florida DOT
obtained from Shr and Chen (2004) published report. The unknown or inaccessible
part of the data, which is necessary for calculation, is assumed as the normal situation
(roadway project type and normal market conditions).
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Delimitations
This directed project includes the following delimitations:
1. The methods indicated and analyzed in this study are the ones that exist and have
been detailed in prior literature;
2. All of the I/D contracting plans mentioned in this study, except the ones that have
been specified, are schedule-based I/D and linear I/D;
3. This study is focused on research done within the United States. Relevant issues that
involve some locale other than the US will not be discussed in this study;
4. This study aims to provide a guide that can be referred to by DOTs whenever
necessary. It does not aim to set standards for I/D contracts.
Limitations
This directed project involves the following limitations:
1. Methods that likely exist and have been used by some DOTs but have never appeared
in published literature are not included in the analysis of this study;
2. The analysis and conclusion of this study are based only on the assumptions, data,
and results of the case studies included within and, as much, may not be suitable for
all situations.
Literature Review
The I/D contracting method usually implements I/D clauses to the typical low bid
method. The DOT pays incentive fees to the contractor, based on each day that the
contractor can complete the project ahead of schedule. Likewise, each day beyond the
completion date will cost contractor a disincentive fee. The FHWA Technical Advisory
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(1989) proposes that daily incentive rates and daily disincentive rates should be equal. If
different rates have been set for incentives and disincentives, it is recommended that the
daily incentive rate should not exceed the daily disincentive rate.
The DOT also sets a cap for the total incentive fee, which means the contractor can
earn no more than this amount by accelerating the schedule. The cap incentive amount is
usually set at a certain percentage of the contract amount, a certain dollar amount, or a set
number of days that will be paid (Sillars 2007). Most DOTs choose a cap of five percent
of the total contract amount. According to FHWA Technical Advisory, a cap for
disincentive should not exist, though some DOTs set equal caps amount for both the
incentive and disincentive (Anderson and Russell 2001).

The existence of cap for

incentive denotes that when the completion date is ahead of schedule, and at some point
the DOT pays the incentives, both the DOT and the contractor will benefit from the
schedule acceleration; however, when the completion date is either beyond the schedule
or it is before the ‘incentive days’, the benefit to either the DOT or the contractor, or both,
will be decreased.
For highway construction projects that are in critical need of early completion, I/D
has effectively led to positive outcomes. Although the percentage of cases using I/D as a
contracting method is relatively small when compared to those using other contracting
methods, the use of I/D remains promising. A fairly high ratio of cases using I/D has
ended with the early completions expected by the owners. Arditi, Khisty and Yasamis
(1997) state that, of the 28 highway construction projects conducted by Illinois DOT
during 1989 and 1993, 79% received full incentives and 21% received partial incentive
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payments. Rister and Wang (2004) note that, between January of 1999 and December of
2002, 32 highway construction projects in Kentucky were selected to use I/D contracting
methods (including both entire contracts and partial contracts). Among the 32 projects,
approximately $10,868,395 has been paid out in incentive fees, and $21,500 has been
collected in disincentive fees.
Background
Although there is no official standard for setting incentive amounts, it has been
accepted and implemented by most DOTs that the incentive amount should be between
Road User Costs (RUC) and the extra acceleration cost to the contractors (Herbsman,
Glagola 1995). Sillars (2007), in his report for the Oregon DOT, formulated an equation,
CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC to express the relationship of I/D. The lower boundary of the
equation is the contractor’s cost caused by acceleration (CA), which should be less than
incentive amount; otherwise there is no reason for the contractor to accelerate the
schedule if the incentive cannot cover the cost. The upper boundary of the equation is
Road User Costs (RUC), which should be greater than the incentive amount; otherwise, it
is meaningless to accelerate the schedule, since an incentive amount greater than RUC
will cost the public even more than if no acceleration were to happen. As DOTs decide
the incentive amount, they should, at minimum, ensure that it complies with Sillars’
equation.
According to Sillars (2007), the estimation of the equation’s upper boundary RUC
has been performed, and its method has now been accepted widely by most agencies. For
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the estimation of the equation’s lower boundary CA, however, there are few
working-level techniques and no commonly accepted method.
Incentive/Disincentive Amount Setting Models
There are several models provided in the literature that can be applicable to DOTs
when deciding the amount of the incentive/disincentive. They are as follows:
Shr and Chen’s model.
Shr and Chen (2004) have developed a model that can determine a reasonable
incentive amount for construction projects. Based on the data collected from Florida
DOT, this model provides a method for determining the optimum incentive days and
incentive amount by putting the incentive/disincentive factor into a functional
relationship between the construction cost and the project duration.
Based on the historical data collected from Florida DOT, the fitted model of
regression appears as:
[(C-C0)/C0]=0.03214+0.10481[(D-D0)/D0] +0.46572[(D-D0)/D0]2
where

(1)

C=Final Construction Cost
D=Days Used
C0=Award Bid
D0=Final Contract Time
Perform the procedures of shifting: (1) determine (D0,C0); (2) Determine the

functional relationship between construction cost and time duration by using the set of
(D0,C0) and Eq. 1; (3) Locate the point of minimum construction cost (D1,C1);(4)
Calculate the distance between (D0,C0) and (D1,C1); (5) Shift the functional relationship
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between the construction cost and the time duration using the distance obtain in the last
step and let (D1,C1) match (D0,C0). After shifting, Equation 2 is developed as:
C=1.0059C0+0.1048C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0] +0.4657C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0]2

(2)

In Eq. 2, it is assumed that every project has an internal relationship between the
construction cost and project duration. The functional relationship between the two is
determined at the same time as (D0, C0) is decided.
Due to the procedure of I/D contract, Incentive/Disincentive relationship is defined
as:
T= (I) × (D-D1)
where

(3)

T=The Anticipated Maximum I/D Amount
I=Daily Linear I/D Amount
D=Construction Time
D1=Contract Time

Put Incentive/Disincentive relationship into Eq. 2:
C=1.0059C0+0.1.48C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0] +0.4657C0 [(D-1.1125D0)/D0]2+ (I) × (D-D1)
(4)
where

D0=Construction Cost Estimate
D1=Contract Time Estimate

Before the bid, there is no way to obtain D0, so it is set that D0=D1.
Construction Time (D) =D0-1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0]

(5)

Finally, the anticipated maximum days for incentive and the anticipated maximum
incentive will be:
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Anticipated Maximum Days for Incentive= (D1-D)

(6)

Anticipated Maximum Incentive=I (D1-D)

(7)

This model is only appropriate for the estimation of linear I/D contracts. The
authors suggest that an engineer’s cost and time estimates can be used to run this model.
After bidding, the contractor’s award bid and contract time can be also used to run this
model and calculate the anticipated maximum days for incentive and the anticipated
maximum incentive.
Though this model is developed according to the historical data from Florida DOT
projects, it can be adopted by any state DOT for a similar situation. However, the
functional relationship between the construction cost and duration needs to be developed
by the client based on construction type, location, and economic factors. Additionally, it
should be noted that this model is project-dependent only.
Sillars and Riedl’s model.
Sillars and Riedl (2007) conclude that the previous incentive amount setting
methods usually consider one of two factors: (1) uses of RUCs; and (2) broad analysis of
the cost of time changes to the contractors, using global bid result information. However,
the congestion and the RUCs for a given segment of highway could continue to be
increased along with growth in population and urbanization. Therefore, considering only
the RUCs for incentive amounts given to contractors could cause the amount to be
substantially higher than what is required to accelerate the work. Thus, Sillars and Riedl’s
model is based on the reflection of contractors’ project economics.
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This model is divided in two stages. In Stage 1, the profit of the project and the
proportion of construction project cost categories (e.g., labor, material, equipment, etc.)
are worked out. In Stage 2, the proportion established in Stage 1 is adjusted for the I/D
amount according to experts’ engineering judgment, and the estimated I/D amount is
calculated according to the adjustment of the proportion.
Aside from the total cost of a project, the profit of the project may also be relevant
to the project type and the market conditions. Based on Carr and Beyor’s (2004) formula
and exploration of Oregon DOT, a formula of predicted highway construction project
profit has been articulated as followed:
P= f / [log (C) m]
where

(8)

P= forecasted profit at bid time
f=factor representing project type
C=estimated total project cost
m=factor representing the market condition.

The value of f-factor and m-factor are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 below.

Table 1
f-Factor Used in Incentive Determination Model
Project Type
A
B
C
D

Description
Roadway
Interchange
Bridge
Complex

f-Factor
1
1.1
1.25
1.35
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Table 2
m-Factor Used in Incentive Determination Model
Market Condition
AA
BB
CC

Description
Busy
Normal
Slow

m-Factor
1.4
1.5
1.6

The authors came up with a broad breakdown of the total costs of a project (see
Table 3 below). The purpose of this breakdown is to provide a starting point for the
calculation of a particular project, for which the user needs to adjust the proportion based
on the original one, according to the engineering judgment and reflection of the
accelerated segment. Then, the user must estimate the impact of acceleration to cost (i.e.,
percentage impact of acceleration to each element of the cost), based on engineering
judgment. At this point, the acceleration cost is obtained from calculation. This
acceleration cost is the lower boundary (CA) of the incentive amount, and RUC is the
upper boundary. Based on engineering judgment, the user decides upon a final incentive
amount that falls between these two boundaries.
This model provides a method that focuses on a particular project’s unique
characteristics, instead of relying on a one-size-fits-all algorithm. Due to the secretive
nature of the highway bidding process, the using of engineering judgment is vital.
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method.
The method most commonly used by DOTs to decide daily I/D amount and cap
amount is Percentage as Maximum Incentive Amount. It is simple to use and requires no
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complicated calculation or historical data collection/analysis. As a result, this method has
been widely accepted as the regular approach to setting I/D amounts. DOTs have
different ways of setting the maximum percentage used in this method, but 5% is
commonly used. Under special circumstances, the fixed percentage amount set by the
DOT may be exceeded after approval by a relative agency. This study will use 5% as the
default percentage when calculating for this method.
The daily I/D amount is calculated by dividing 5% of the total contract amount by
the I/D time, which is the number of days that the contractor can use to accelerate a
project. According to WVDOT (2003), the I/D time is usually decided by the following
process: (1) The number of days of a normal schedule is the total working time in hours
divided by a selected normal number of working hours (such as eight hours per day for
five working days per week); (2) The number of days of an accelerated schedule is the
total working time in hours divided by a selected accelerated number of working hours
(such as 16 hours per day for six working days per week); (3) Subtracting the number of
days of the normal schedule by the number of days of the accelerated schedule equals I/D
time, which is the maximum number of days the contractor can save by accelerating the
schedule.
It should be noted that, to avoid making the incentive days too long, the calculation
of the normal number of working hours sometimes uses an aggressive pace of work, such
as ten working hours per day multiplied five working days per week.
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After the above calculation is performed, justification is sometimes necessary. A
process must then conducted to verify that the I/D amount falls between the CA and the
RUC.
Conclusion
There is a modest amount of literature on the various I/D amount-setting models
that are applicable to this study and thus can be used as references when a DOT is trying
to set a reasonable I/D amount for highway construction project using the I/D contracting
method. The principles of these methods may vary, but nearly all are based on the
relationship of CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC. However, the application, effectiveness, and
practical use of these models still needs to be verified.
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Table 3
Sub-element Breakdown of Project Costs
Elementa

Sub-elementb

Direct cost
Labor
Materials
Equipment
Indirect cost
Supervision
Time-related facilities

Value
Roadway
82%
25%
45%
30%
6%
2%
1%

Interchange
78%
30%
35%
35%
9%
3%
1%

Bridge
79%
30%
30%
40%
8%
2%
1%

Complex
77%
33%
37%
30%
9%
4%
1%

Non-time-related facilities

1%

1%

1%

1%

Mobilization/demobilization

3%

5%

5%

5%

1%
12%
3%
8%

1%
13%
5%
8%

1%
13%
5%
8%

1%
14%
6%
8%

Insurance and taxes
Markup
Risk
Home Office G&A
Profit (Calculated Separately)
a
Stated as a percentage of total project cost.
b
Stated as a percentage of total direct cost
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Analysis of the Models
The I/D amount setting methods discussed in this study are analyzed both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
Shr and Chen’s Model
Shr and Chen’s model’s equation is based on historical data and used regression
analysis. By only knowing the contract amount and the contract time of a particular
project, the anticipated maximum days for incentive can be predicted. Then, by
calculating the daily RUC, the anticipated maximum incentive for the project can be
obtained.
The traits of Shr and Chen’s model are:
1. It can only be used for the prediction of the maximum days for incentive or maximum
incentive for I/D contracts;
2. It is easy to use. Simply put in the data (construction duration and construction cost)
of a particular project at an exact stage (DOT’s estimate, contractor’s bid or final data
at the end of the project) to run the model, and the result will be obtained;
3. As stated above, this model can be used many times during different stages of the
project to adjust the days of incentive and the corresponding daily incentive amount
whenever needed;
4. The model depends on other resources to obtain the daily RUC, which is needed in
the process of calculation;
5. The original data that has been used to obtain this equation is from FDOT projects.
Therefore, the equation provided by Shr and Chen’s research is only suitable for the
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use of FDOT project. However, this model can be adopted by other DOTs. The
functional relationship of construction cost and construction duration in the equation
needs to be developed by other DOTs’ own historical projects. Thus, the functional
relationship developed by the exact DOT suits for the location, construction type, and
economic factors in the exact area well.
Sillars and Riedl’s Model
Sillars and Riedl’s model does not require the support of historical data. It involves
breaking down the construction costs, estimating the contractor’s cost of accelerating the
work (CA), and then adding incentive profit to obtain the final incentive amount for a
project.
Through analysis, the traits of Sillars and Riedl’s model are:
1. It does not employ a one-fits-all algorithm. It focuses more on the particular project
that is being estimated. Therefore, the model could possibly estimate one project
possibly more accurately.
2. It takes account of an array of factors (project type, project size and market condition)
that comprise a particular project. This makes the model more accurate to estimate the
incentive amount.
3. The process of using this model to estimate the incentive amount is relatively difficult.
Unlike other models designed for the same aim, Sillars and Riedl’ model cannot be
used by simply inputting the data in an equation and then getting a result by solving
the equation. This model requires a fair amount of analysis and calculation, which
makes the result more accurate for a particular project’s estimation.
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4. Apart from analysis and calculation, the model also requires an engineer’s judgment
when estimating the changed percentage in each sub-element caused by the
acceleration. Though it has not been specified particularly in the article, additional
engineering judgment might be needed at the beginning of stage two when using this
model. The percentage of each segment from the original breakdown is used as
starting point and needs to be adjusted according to the specific project by the
engineer’s judgment.
5. The number of days that could be used for acceleration is not provided through the
calculation of this model. It needs to be determined manually.
6. The final result from this model may need to be verified by the equation that
expresses the original relationship of I/D amount: CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC.
Percentage as Maximum Incentive (PMI) Amount Method
Percentage as maximum incentive amount method is widely used by DOTs as
incentive amount setting method. The use of this method does not have a standard or
specific procedure. DOTs decide how to conduct the calculation when using this method.
The method does not have much reasoning or equations for back up, and depends upon
the accumulated experience from prior historical projects and rules set by DOTs.
Through analysis, the traits of PMI method are:
1. When using the method, DOTs have different default amount for their incentive
amount setting. As listed in Table 4 below, DOTs cap rates can be decided by fixed
percentage of contract amount, fixed dollar amount, and various negotiable ways.
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2. The method does not contain any complicated calculation, nor require an engineer’s
judgment. Therefore, once the fixed percentage or dollar amount is decided, it is
relatively simple to use.
3. While simple to use, it lacks of a solid scientific foundation, and therefore, lacks the
accuracy of the previous two models.
4. The final results may still need to be verified by using the equation: CA ≤ I / D ≤
RUC.

Table 4
Incentive/Disincentive Cap Rates for Various State Highway Agencies (Herbsman, Chen
and Epstien 1995; Shr and Chen 2004)
State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

Cap
None
±30days
None
Dollar Amounta
None
None
Varies
None
Varies
None
Dollar Amountc
None
Dollar Amounta
Dollar Amountc
5%
None
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Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
a
Fixed.
b
Fixed except the A+B contracts.
c
Fixed or negotiated not available.

22
5%
None
10%
Varies
Varies
None
Dollars 100,000
10%
Varies
5%
5%
5%
None
None
Dollar Amountc
Dollar Amountb
5%
Varies
6-8%

Conclusion
As stated above, the three models discussed in this research have apparent
differences, as well as some common attributes. These are summarized in Table 5 below.

Table 5
Comparison of the Incentive Amount Setting Methods
Incentive Amount Setting Method
Shr and Chen’s
Sillars and
Percentage as maximum
Model
Riedl’ model
incentive amount method
Whether Used Widely
Not Sure
Not Sure
Yes
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Engineer's Judgment
Involved
Simple to Use
Whether Have
Reasoning Process
Based on CA ≤ I / D
≤ RUC
Need Daily RUC in
the Calculation

23

Yes
Yes, once the
equation is given

Yes, a lot

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Case Study
Due to the limited accessibility of DOT’s historical data and information, some of
the information used in this study is assumed according to the normal situation (roadway
project type and normal market conditions).
Case Study 1: FDOT Project FM210623
Project FM210623’s award bid and contract time, as estimated by FDOT, are
$9,213,000 and 650 days, respectively. The daily RUC for that portion is $5,992. The
following sections show the outcomes for running each model with the data of Project
FM210623.
Shr and Chen’s model.
When applying the Shr and Chen’s model to Project FM210623’s data, (650, 9213)
is given as (D0, C0) and 5.992 is given as I in Equation 5 and Equation 6. The specific
calculation is as followed:
D = D0-1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0]
= 650-1.0736 × [(5.992 × 6502)/9213]
= 650-295
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= 355 (days)
The maximum days for incentive= 650-355=295 (days)
The maximum incentive = $5,992 × 295= $ 1,767,640
Sillars and Riedl’s model.
When applying the Sillars and Riedl’s model to Project FM210623’s data,
$9,213,000 is given as total project estimate and, based on the result of running Shr and
Chen’s model above, 295 is used as reasonable number of acceleration days (at the very
least, it can be said that 295 is a reasonable number of days that cannot be exceeded by
incentive days). It is assumed that Project FM210623’s project type is roadway and its
market conditions are normal. So the factor f and factor m can be read from Table 1 and
Table 2 respectively, and the values are 1.00 and 1.50 respectively. Also, the breakdown
percentage of roadway is applied to Project FM210623’s stage I value.
The basic information of Project FM210623 is summarized in Table 6 below.

Table 6
Project FM210623 Input Value
Project FM210623
Type
Market Condition
Total Project Estimate
Reasonable Acceleration Days
Estimated Daily RUC

A (Roadway)
BB (Normal)
$9,213,000
290 Days
$5,992
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The value of f (1.00) and m (1.50) and the project value ($9,213,000) are inserted
into Equation8 to calculate the profit value. The result is 1.00/[log($9,213,000)1.50] =
9.0%. The percentage breakdown of roadway from Table 3 is used as the stage I value,
and 9.0% is inserted as the stage I value of profit. The result of this process is shown in
Table 7 below.

Table 7
Project FM210623 Stage I Value
Elementa

Sub-elementb

Direct cost
Labor
Materials
Equipment
Subcontract

82%
25%
45%
30%
0%

Supervision
Time-related facilities
Non-time-related facilities
Mobilization/demobilization
Insurance and taxes

6%
2%
1%
1%
3%
1%

Indirect cost

Markup
Risk
Home office G&A
Profit
a
b

Stage I Value

Stated as a percentage of total project cost
Stated as a percentage of total direct cost

12%
3%
8%
9.0%
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After the starting point of the breakdown percentage is provided, the percentage is
adjusted to better reflect of the reality of the actual project. According to Table 7 above,
the starting point percentage of labor for roadway project is 25%. However, the need of
acceleration may result in a higher percentage of labor being requested. It is assumed that
the user increases the labor percentage value to 30%, and then the percentage values of
material and/or equipment are decreased for the purpose of maintaining the total cost at
100%. The same process of adjustment is carried out for each percentage of the
sub-element in the table. According to the adjusted percentage value, the portion specific
value is obtained.

The percentage adjustment and portion specific value for each part is

shown in Table 8 below.

Table 8
State II Adjustment of Project FM210623
Elementa

Sub-elementb

Direct
cost
Labor
Materials
Equipment
Subcontractor
Indirect
cost
Supervision
Time-related
facilities
Non-time-related
facilities

Stage 1
Value (%)

Project Specific
Value (%)

Portion Specific
Value ($)

81%
25%
45%
30%
0%

76%
25%
45%
30%
0%

7,001,880

6%
2%

8%
2%

770,207

1%

1%

70,019

1%

1%

70,019

1,750,470
3,150,846
2,100,564
0

140,038
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Mobilization/demobi
lization
Insurance and taxes
Markup
Risk
Home office G&A
Profit

3%
1%
12%
3%
8%
9.0%

Total
Stated as a percentage of total project cost
b
Stated as a percentage of total direct cost
a
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5%
2%
15%
5%
10%
9.50%
100%

350,094
140,038
1,715,461
350,094
700,188
665,179
9,487,547

Once the actual percentage of each sub-element is estimated, the percentage
increase (or decrease) of each sub-element caused by the acceleration is estimated
through project knowledge and engineering judgment. It is assumed that double shifting
is necessary for the acceleration, and the labor element is assumed to increase by 20%.
From Table 8 above, the portion specific value for labor is $1,750,470. So, the
acceleration cost for labor is $1,750,470 × 20% = $350,094. Except the profit portion, the
same process of acceleration impact estimation is carried out for each sub-element. The
result of acceleration impact estimation and the calculation of acceleration cost are shown
in Table 9 below.

Table 9
Acceleration Impact of Project FM210623
Elementa Sub-elementb
Direct
cost
Labor

Portion Specific
Value ($)

Acceleration
Impact (+/-%)

7,001,880
1,750,470

8%
20%

Acceleration
Cost (+/- $)
465,625
350,094
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Materials
Equipment
Subcontractor
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3,150,846
2,100,564
0

5%
-2%
0%

770,207
140,038

1%
10%

70,019

-5%

70,019

0

-

350,094
140,038
1,715,461

0
0
12%

-

350,094
700,188
665,179
Total
9,487,547
a
Stated as a percentage of total project cost
b
Stated as a percentage of total direct cost

50%
0%

Indirect
cost
Supervision
Time-related
facilities
Non-time-related
facilities
Mobilization/demob
ilization
Insurance and taxes
Markup
Risk
Home office G&A
Profit

8%

157,542
(42,011)
10,503
14,004
(3,501)

175,047
175,047
651,175

According to Table 9 above, the total cost caused by the acceleration is $651,175.
This value is actually the total contractor’s cost caused by acceleration (CA). The
incentive should include some profit besides the CA. Sillars and Riedl provide a method
for calculating the profit’s neutral value (i.e., the lowest point of reward to the contractor
as an incentive profit). The profit neutral value is the result of direct cost’s acceleration
cost ($465,625) times the project specific value of profit percentage in Table 8 above
(9.5%). So the profit neutral value is $465,625 × 9.5% = $44,234. The actual profit that is
offered to the contractor should be higher than the neutral value to encourage acceleration.
It is assumed that the profit is three times that of the neutral value, which in this case is
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$44,234 × 3= $132,702. According to the calculation, the final incentive amount is
$651,175 + $132,702 = $783,877. The whole process of calculating Project FM210623’s
incentive amount using Sillars and Riedl’s model is shown in Table 10 below.
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method.
When applying the percentage as maximum incentive amount method to Project
FM210623’s data, it is assumed that the percentage value is 5%. Therefore, the incentive
amount for Project FM210623 is $9,213,000 × 5% = $460,650. It is assumed that the
normal schedule uses an aggressive pace of work (ten working hours per day multiplied
by five working days per week), and the accelerated schedule uses an accelerated pace of
work (16 working hours per day multiplied by six days per week). The calculation of
incentive days using the percentage as maximum incentive amount method is as follows:
The total weeks of normal schedule = 650days/7days = 93 weeks
The total hours needed = 10hours per day × 5days per week ×93 weeks =
4650hours
The working hours per week of accelerated schedule = 16hours per day × 6days per
week = 96 hours per week
The total weeks of accelerated schedule = 4650hours/96hours per week = 48 weeks
The total days of accelerated schedule = 48weeks × 7days per week = 336days
The maximum incentive days = 650days – 336days = 314 days
Summary of Case Study 1.
The results of calculating Project FM210623’s incentive amount and incentive
duration using the three models are shown in Table 11 below. According to the values
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obtained from the calculation of each model, there are differences among the results from
the three models. The incentive amount calculated by the Shr and Chen’s model
($1,767,640) is the largest among the three. Theoretically, it can be set as the maximum
incentive amount which is used more for the purpose of controlling the incentive amount
under the total RUC, rather than as the final specific incentive amount value. The
incentive amount calculated by PMI method ($460,650) is the smallest among the three.
The amount could save the most capital for the DOTs. However, it might not have
enough encouragement for the contractors to accelerate the schedules. Moreover,
compared with the result calculated by the Sillars and Riedl’s model, it is very probably
under the reasonable contractor’s cost caused by acceleration (CA). The incentive amount
calculated by Sillars and Riedl’s model ($783,877) is more reasonable compared with the
other two results, and it can be set as the specific incentive amount value, not the
maximum incentive amount. The comparison of the incentive amount calculated by each
method is shown in Figure 1 below.
As to the calculation of incentive duration by each model, only the Shr and Chen’s
model and the percentage as maximum incentive amount method have included the
calculation of incentive duration. The results of the two models are close to each other.
The result of the percentage as maximum incentive amount method (314 days) is 6%
larger than the result of the Shr and Chen’s model (295 days). Before the calculation of
the Sillars and Riedl’s model, a reasonable number of acceleration days needs to be given.
So, the calculation of the Sillars and Riedl’s model might need to depend on another
model.
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Table 10
Sillars and Riedl’s model Incentive Determination User Screen of Project FM210623
Project
Type
Market Condition
Total Project Estimate
Total Project Direct
Cost Estimate
Reasonable
Acceleration Days
Estimated RUC/Day
Elementa

FM210623
Roadway
Normal
9,213,000
7,001,880
295
5,992
Sub-elementb

Direct cost
Labor
Materials
Equipment
Subcontractor
Indirect cost
Supervision
Time-related
facilities
Non-time-related
facilities
Mobilization/demo
bilization

Stage 1
Project Specific Portion Specific
Acceleration
Acceleration
Value (%)
Value (%)
Value ($)
Impact (+/-%)
Cost (+/- $)
81%
76%
7,001,880
8%
465,625
25%
25%
1,750,470
20%
350,094
45%
45%
3,150,846
5%
157,542
30%
30%
2,100,564
-2%
(42,011)
0%
0%
0
0%
6%
8%
770,207
1%
10,503
2%
2%
140,038
10%
14,004
1%

1%

70,019

-5%

(3,501)

1%

1%

70,019

0

-

3%

5%

350,094

0

-
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Insurance and
taxes
Markup
Risk
Home office G&A
Profit
Total
Acceleration Cost
651,175
I/D Incentive Profit
132,703
Total Incentive Amount
783,878
a
Stated as a percentage of total project cost
b
Stated as a percentage of total direct cost

1%
12%
3%
8%
9.0%
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2%
15%
5%
10%
9.50%
100%

140,038
1,715,461
350,094
700,188
665,179
9,487,547

0
12%
50%
0%
8%

175,047
175,047
651,175
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Table 11
Comparison of Incentive Amount and Incentive Duration of Project FM210623
Calculated by Three Models
Model

Incentive Amount ($)

Incentive Duration (days)

1,767,640
783,877
460,650

295
314

Shr and Chen’s Model
Sillars and Riedl’s Model
PMI Method

Case St udy 1 I ncent i ve Amount Compar i son

I ncent i ve Amount

2, 000, 000

Shr and Chen’ s Model

1, 500, 000
Si l l ar s and Ri edl ’ s
Model

1, 000, 000

Per cent age as Maxi mum
I ncent i ve Amount
Met hod

500, 000
0

1
Met hod

Figure 1. Case Study 1 Incentive Amount Comparison

Case Study 2: FDOT Project FM229629
Project FM229629’s award bid and contract time estimated by FDOT are
$3,849,000 and 485 days, respectively. The daily RUC for that portion is $2,700. The
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following sections show the outcomes of running each model using the data of Project
FM229629.
Shr and Chen’s model.
Using (485, 3829) as (D0, C0) and applying Equation 5 and Equation 6, the process
of calculation is shown below:
D = D0 - 1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0]
= 485- 1.0736× (2.7×4852/3829)
= 485-177
= 308 (days)
The maximum days for incentive= 485-308=177 (days)
The maximum incentive amount= $2,700 × 177 days=$477,900
Sillars and Riedl’s model.
The same assumptions (project type, market condition, specific sub-element
percentage breakdown, acceleration impact, and how many times I/D incentive profit
value is more than the neutral profit value) are made when applying Sillars and Riedl’s
model to Project FM229629. The calculation result of Project FM229629’s incentive
amount using Sillars and Riedl’s model is shown in Table 12 below.
The calculation of Sillars and Riedl’s model shows that Project FM229629 has an
acceleration cost of $272,047, and an incentive profit of $55,441. The total incentive
amount of Project FM238320 is $327,488.
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method.
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When applying the PMI method to Project FM229629’s data, the same assumptions
(percentage value of incentive amount, normal schedule pace of work and accelerated
schedule pace of work) are made as the ones applied to Project FM210623 when using
the other two methods. So the incentive amount for Project FM229629 is $3,849,000 ×
5% = $192,450. The calculation of incentive days using the percentage as maximum
incentive amount method is as followed:
The total weeks of normal schedule = 485days/7days = 69 weeks
The total hours needed = 10hours per day × 5days per week ×69 weeks =
3464hours
The working hours per week of accelerated schedule = 16hours per day × 6days per
week = 96 hours per week
The total weeks of accelerated schedule = 3464hours/96hours per week = 36 weeks
The total days of accelerated schedule = 36weeks × 7days per week = 253days
The maximum incentive days = 485days – 253days = 232 days
Summary of Case Study 2.
The results of calculating Project FM229629’s incentive amount and incentive
duration using the three models are shown in Table 13 below.
The differences among the results calculated by three models are similar with those
in Case Study 1. The Shr and Chen’s model has the largest incentive amount ($477,900),
while the percentage as maximum incentive amount method has the smallest result of
incentive amount ($192,450). The result of the Sillars and Riedl’s model falls in between
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the results of other two models. The comparison of the incentive amount calculated by
each method is shown in Figure 2 below.

Table 13
Comparison of Incentive Amount and Incentive Duration of Project FM229629
Calculated by Three Models
Model
Shr and Chen’s Model
Sillars and Riedl’s Model
PMI Method

Incentive Amount ($)
477,900
327,488
192,450

Incentive Duration (days)
177
232

The incentive durations of the Shr and Chen’s model and the percentage as
maximum incentive amount method are not as close to each other as that in Case Study 1.
The incentive duration calculated by the percentage as maximum incentive amount
method (232 days) is 31% larger than that calculated the Shr and Chen’s model (177
days).
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Table 12
Sillars and Riedl’s model Incentive Determination User Screen of Project FM229629
Project
Type
Market Condition
Total Project Estimate
Total Project Direct
Cost Estimate
Reasonable
Acceleration Days
Estimated RUC/Day
Elementa

FM229629
Roadway
Normal
3,849,000
2,925,240
177
2,700
Sub-elementb

Direct cost
Labor
Materials
Equipment
Subcontractor
Indirect cost
Supervision
Time-related
facilities
Non-time-related
facilities
Mobilization/demo

Stage 1 Project Specific Portion Specific
Acceleration
Acceleration
Value (%)
Value (%)
Value ($)
Impact (+/-%)
Cost (+/- $)
81%
76%
2,925,240
8%
194,528
25%
25%
731,310
20%
146,262
45%
45%
1,316,358
5%
65,818
30%
30%
877,572
-2%
(17,551)
0%
0%
0
0%
6%
2%
1%

8%
2%

321,776
58,505

1%
10%

1%

29,252

-5%

1%
5%

29,252
146,262

0
0

4,388
5,850
(1,463)

1%
3%

-
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bilization
Insurance and
taxes
Markup
Risk
Home office G&A
Profit
Total
Acceleration Cost
272,047
I/D Incentive Profit
55,441
Total Incentive Amount
327,488
a
Stated as a percentage of total project cost
b
Stated as a percentage of total direct cost
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1%
2%
12%
3%
8%
9.5%

15%
5%
10%
9.50%
100%

58,505
716,684
146,262
292,524
277,898
3,963,700

0

-

12%
50%
0%

73,131

8%

272,047

73,131
-
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Case St udy 2 I ncent i ve Amount Compar i son

I ncent i ve Amount

600, 000

Shr and Chen’ s Model

500, 000
400, 000

Si l l ar s and Ri edl ’ s
Model

300, 000
200, 000

Per cent age as Maxi mum
I ncent i ve Amount
Met hod

100, 000
0

1
Met hod

Figure 2. Case Study 2 Incentive Amount Comparison

Case Study 3: FDOT Project FM238320
Project FM238320’s award bid and contract time estimated by FDOT are
$7,534,000 and 485 days, respectively. The daily RUC for that portion is $3,500. The
following steps are running each model with the data of Project FM238320.
Shr and Chen’s model.
Using (485, 7534) as (D0,C0) and applying Equation 5 and Equation 6, the process
of calculation is shown below:
D = D0 - 1.0736× [(I×D02)/C0]
= 485- 1.0736× (3.5×4852/7534)
= 485-117
= 368 (days)
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The maximum days for incentive= 485-368=117 (days)
The maximum incentive amount= $3,500 × 117 days=$409,500
Sillars and Riedl’s model.
The same assumptions (project type, market condition, specific sub-element
percentage breakdown, acceleration impact, and how many times I/D incentive profit
value is more than the neutral profit value) are made when applying Sillars and Riedl’s
model to Project FM238320. The calculation results of Project FM238320’s incentive
amount using Sillars and Riedl’s model is shown in Table 14 below.
The calculation of Sillars and Riedl’s model shows that Project FM238320 has an
acceleration cost of $532,503, and an incentive profit of $109,661. The total incentive
amount of Project FM238320 is $642,164.
Percentage as maximum incentive amount (PMI) method.
When applying the PMI method to Project FM238320’s data, the same assumptions
(percentage value of incentive amount, normal schedule pace of work and accelerated
schedule pace of work) are made as those applied to Project FM210623 when using the
other two methods. So the incentive amount for Project FM238320 is $7,534,000 × 5% =
$376,700. The calculation of incentive days using the percentage as maximum incentive
amount method is as followed:
The total weeks of normal schedule = 485days/7days = 69 weeks
The total hours needed = 10hours per day × 5days per week ×69 weeks =
3464hours
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The working hours per week of accelerated schedule = 16hours per day × 6days per
week = 96 hours per week
The total weeks of accelerated schedule = 3464hours/96hours per week = 36 weeks
The total days of accelerated schedule = 36weeks × 7days per week = 253days
The maximum incentive days = 485days – 253days = 232 days
Summary of Case Study 3.
The results of calculating Project FM238320’s incentive amount and incentive
duration using the three models are shown in Table 15 below. According to the results
obtained from the three models, there are still apparent differences. However, the
differences among the results are not similar with the differences in the previous two case
studies. The Sillars and Riedl’s model has the largest value of incentive amount
($642,164) among the three. The percentage as maximum incentive amount method still
has the smallest value of incentive amount ($376,700). The incentive amount calculated
by the Shr and Chen’s model ($409,500) falls in between the other two results. The
comparison of the incentive amount calculated by each method is shown in Figure 3
below.
The two results of the incentive days are no longer close to one another. The larger
result calculated by the PMI method (232 days) is nearly two times the amount calculated
by the Shr and Chen’s model (117 days).

Table 15

EVALUATION OF I/D CONTRACTING METHOD

42

Comparison of Incentive Amount and Incentive Duration of Project FM238320
Calculated by Three Models
Model
Shr and Chen’s Model
Sillars and Riedl’s Model
PMI Method

Incentive Amount ($)
409,500
642,164
376,700

Incentive Duration (days)
117
232

Case St udy 3 I ncent i ve Amount Compar i son

I ncent i ve Amount

700, 000

Shr and Chen’ s Model

600, 000
500, 000

Si l l ar s and Ri edl ’ s
Model

400, 000
300, 000
200, 000

Per cent age as Maxi mum
I ncent i ve Amount
Met hod

100, 000
0

1
Met hod

Figure 3. Case Study 3 Incentive Amount Comparison
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Table 14
Sillars and Riedl’s model Incentive Determination User Screen of Project FM238320
Project
Type
Market Condition
Total Project Estimate
Total Project Direct
Cost Estimate
Reasonable
Acceleration Days
Estimated RUC/Day
Elementa

FM238320
Roadway
Normal
7,534,000
5,725,840
117
3,500
Sub-elementb

Direct cost
Labor
Materials
Equipment
Subcontractor
Indirect cost

Stage 1 Project Specific Portion Specific
Acceleration
Acceleration
Value (%)
Value (%)
Value ($)
Impact (+/-%)
Cost (+/- $)
81%
76%
5,725,840
8%
380,768
25%
25%
1,431,460
20%
286,292
45%
45%
2,576,628
5%
128,831
30%
30%
1,717,752
-2%
(34,355)
0%
0%
0
0%
6%

Supervision
Time-related
facilities
Non-time-related
facilities
Mobilization/demo

2%

8%
2%

1%
1%
3%

629,842
114,517

1%
10%

1%

57,258

-5%

1%
5%

57,258
286,292

0
0

8,589
11,452
(2,863)
-

EVALUATION OF I/D CONTRACTING METHOD

bilization
Insurance and
taxes
Markup
Risk
Home office G&A
Profit
Total
Acceleration Cost
532,503
I/D Incentive Profit
109,661
Total Incentive Amount
642,164
a
Stated as a percentage of total project cost
b
Stated as a percentage of total direct cost
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1%

2%

114,517

0

-

12%
3%
8%
9.1%

15%
5%
10%
9.60%

1,408,557
286,292
572,584
549,681

12%
50%
0%

143,146

100%

7,764,239

8%

532,503

143,146
-
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Findings
During the course of this project, several findings were made with respect to
estimate incentive amount and incentive duration using the three models in the case study.
The general findings are as follows:
1. Compared with the Shr and Chen’s model and the PMI method, the Sillars and
Riedl’s model takes more time and effort to use. The results of the Sillars and Riedl’s
model depend more on the situation of the particular project and display greater
uncertainty than the other two models.
2. For most of the case, the PMI method has a lowest incentive amount among all the
results of the three models. This incentive amount will probably not provide enough
encouragement to the contractor for acceleration.
3. It is quite probable that the Shr and Chen’s model has the largest result of incentive
amount, which is more suitable to be used as the upper bound of incentive amount
setting. Compared with the Shr and Chen’s model and the PMI method, the Sillars
and Riedl’s model is likely to have a more reasonable incentive amount, which is
neither too large nor too small. But calculation results of the Sillars and Riedl’s model
does not include the incentive duration, which needs to be provided by the other two
models or other method.
4. When the Shr and Chen’s model has the largest incentive amount among the results
of the three models, the two results of incentive duration calculated by the Shr and
Chen’s model and the percentage as maximum incentive amount method are similar.
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5. When in a particular project which has a relatively large contract amount, and a
relatively small daily RUC and contract duration, the Sillars and Riedl’s model is
likely to have a larger result of incentive amount than the Shr and Chen’s model.
6. When the Sillars and Riedl’s model has the largest incentive amount, the incentive
durations calculated by the Shr and Chen’s model and the percentage as maximum
incentive amount method are not close.
7. The equation, CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC, is the basic factor used in I/D amount setting. All
the models evaluated in this project have either included the equation in its basic
philosophy, or applied the equation in its post-calculating verification.
Conclusions
Through data collection concerning I/D amount setting models, and case studies
focusing on the outcomes of each model, it is apparent that there are marked differences
among the usage and results of each model. This directed project finds that for one
particular highway project using I/D contracting, there appears to be great differences in
I/D amount by choosing different I/D amount setting method. It is also confirmed that the
equation CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC is the basic theory of I/D. No matter what method is used
when setting the incentive, the equation CA ≤ I / D ≤ RUC can be applied to the
process of setting for the purpose of calculation or verification.
Recommendations
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The following recommendations are based on the knowledge gained from this
research:
1. For a better result of incentive amount, the DOT can apply each of the models for a
particular project. After comparing and adjusting the different results, a final result
can be determined, which will satisfy the basic requirements and be fair and attractive
to each party involved.
2. For projects that are in extreme need of acceleration, the percentage as maximum
incentive amount method might not be a good choice for setting incentive amount for
DOTs. In such a case, the DOT might need to consider the other two models.
3. When the portion of a project has a relatively high RUC and the incentive duration
has been set relatively long, the Sillars and Riedl’s model is a better choice for the
DOT.
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